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The Power Report was published in the spring of 2006 as ‘an independent inquiry into Britain’s democracy’, funded by Joseph Rowntree and carried out by a Commission headed up by Helena Kennedy, QC.​[1]​ The Report is essentially a reaction to what its authors believe is a crisis in British governance. At the heart of this crisis, it suggests, lies a sclerotic system which has failed to keep pace with social change and which is run by elites disconnected from those they are supposed to serve, many of whom are therefore turning away from conventional politics altogether. It attempts to be evidence based, even-handed and, above all, accessible. We believe, however, that it is fundamentally flawed. The Report overdoes the seriousness of the symptoms that so concern it. It underplays important elements in its diagnosis. And many of its suggested cures—even those which do seem to follow from that diagnosis—are unconvincing and highly problematic.
	This is the case, we suggest, because the Report’s authors are not merely unhappy with politics in Britain but appear to be ambivalent at best about representative politics per se. The latter is a continuous process of ongoing, iterative games involving a range of principals and agents—a process that necessarily involves coalitions and compromises, consequences that cannot be predicted, and complexity that cannot simply be cut through. In short, it is an inherently imperfect mechanism of conflict resolution in which not everybody will be interested, let alone happy, all of the time.
	The politics and the modus operandi of the Power Report, however, are, we would argue, inherently populist.​[2]​ It argues that representative politics and the institutions it relies on are in crisis and not really up to the job. Left to their own devices they will betray rather than promote and protect our interests. As a result, they need to be, on the one hand, by-passed by more direct democracy and, on the other, hemmed in by binding contracts, obligations and requirements. To do anything less would mean selling the people short. This attitude runs right the way through the Report. It drives what it sees as the problem, as well as the causes of and solutions for that problem. And it seriously weakens, we believe, the Report’s claims to be evidence based—at least in the way any social scientist would understand that term. Here we focus on four key criticisms.
	First, we argue that the characteristically populist tendency to see virtue residing overwhelmingly in ordinary people and to operate with a binary logic means that the Report sets up a false dichotomy between what it calls ‘formal politics’ and other types of broadly political activity, as well as overstating the extent to which most of us are active citizens. Moreover, it confuses the role of citizen and consumer.
	Second, we suggest that the Report is so persuaded that the key causes of the disconnect it identifies lie with the system rather than with ordinary people that it fits the evidence to the argument, rather than the other way around.
	Third, and relatedly, we contend that the Report’s overriding (and typically populist) faith in the wisdom of ordinary people means that it appears to have heard rather than really listened to the experts it called as witnesses. We also worry that its own choice of proxies for ‘the people’ was worryingly narrow.




The Power Report counterposes a people seemingly bursting with pent-up democratic energy with an elitist and bankrupt political system incapable of tapping that burgeoning potential. On page 12 of the tone-setting foreword by Helena Kennedy, for instance, we are reminded that, while they are no longer keen on joining parties or getting involved in ‘formal politics’ or even voting,

[p]eople in Britain still volunteer; they run in Marathons for charity; they hold car boot sales to raise funds for good causes; they take part in Red Nose days and wear ribbons for breast cancer or AIDS. They sit as school governors, do prison visiting, read with children who have learning difficulties. They take part in school races and run the school disco. They march against the Iraq war and in favour of the countryside. They sign petitions for extra street lights and more frequent bin collection. They send their savings to the victims of tsunamis and want to end world poverty.

	But look closer and things start getting a little more complicated—and civil society a little less vibrant. For a start, most of the activities mentioned entail very little ongoing involvement or investment of time rather than money, while those that do attract very few people—as anyone who has tried to recruit fellow parents for anything other than one-off events (and even that can be hard) will testify.
	Moreover, there is no inherent reason why we should separate activities like marching or signing from ‘formal politics’: they are part of a flexible repertoire of protest and pressure that has been around for years, coexisting and complementing—rather than crowding out—electoral participation. And many of the causes marched and signed for are as much to do with resource conflicts as they are with collective goods: the so-called ‘green-welly brigade’, for instance, were not standing up for ‘the countryside’ but for a very particular view of how rural life should be lived—and funded. Indeed, even some of the charitable activities mentioned are as much to do with identity politics or showing the kids a good time as they are with pure selflessness. Nor should we allow ourselves to forget that the numbers involved in those activities that do attract large numbers of people (that is, not the school governing, the prison visiting and the reading out loud) are dwarfed by the numbers who do turn out to vote. We should also remember that, in all probability, those that do get involved—especially in the more demanding, longer-term commitments—do it in addition to, rather than instead of, participating in ‘formal politics’.
	It is at least possible, then, that what Kennedy’s alluring pen-portrait tells us is that ‘the people’—or most of us anyway—get involved largely in what suits us, and what suits us is either what touches us emotionally or what affects us fairly directly. What many of us run scared from is anything ongoing, anything time-sapping, anything conflictual, and (and to name two of the twenty-first century’s cardinal sins) anything ‘difficult’ and ‘boring’.
	But the Report cannot seem to bring itself to discuss such depressing possibilities, intent as it is on blaming the system rather than the people—in whom, in true populist fashion, all virtue is assumed to reside. This is hardly surprising given that, for the most part, the Report is determined to accept almost everything the people—as represented by a specially commissioned citizen’s panel, a survey of non-voters, a bunch of self-appointed ‘community activists’ and sundry submitters—say. Even the manner in which the opinions of these allegedly representative respondents are laid out—largely anonymously in quote after ‘indicative quote’—gives the impression of a flood of disinterested, well-intentioned, public criticism rather than what, for all we know, could be either self-interested special pleading from pressure groups who think they know better or self-justificatory exculpation from people who simply can’t be bothered. In fact, one could go so far as to argue that the Report—especially in determining what is wrong—takes what its respondents ‘feel’, ‘regard’ and ‘see’ more seriously than what might actually be going on.​[3]​
	Nowhere, it seems, does the Report come even close to wondering whether the opinions it sets such store by might be founded on ignorance, prejudice, self-interest or just plain laziness. Neither does the Report engage with the argument that politics, like many other aspects of life, may (and perhaps should) involve a different logic to that of the market. When it comes to democracy, people’s desires for the same quality and quantity of choice (and the same consumer rights) that they enjoy when shopping may not be merely unrealistic and unworkable, but profoundly inappropriate. Most people would be horrified at the suggestion that they should apply consumer logic to, say, family relationships. Yet a citizen is no more a consumer than a parent is. Both roles involve thinking long term, putting up with the rough as well as the smooth, facing the fact that things don’t turn out the way you expected, even showing an interest because sometimes that’s just what you have to do.




When it comes to the particular causes of the malaise the Report seeks to cure, it is too quick to place some distinct possibilities in a category it calls (in Chapter 2) ‘Red Herrings’.  This implies that any one putting them forward must somehow be deliberately trying to throw the people off the scent of what it calls, in confident contradistinction (in Chapter 3), ‘the Reality’. For the most part, however, the Report is astute enough to give the appearance of not dismissing alternative explanations out of hand: few are rejected without a disarming admission that they may have something to them. But inevitably this something is then deemed to pale into insignificance compared to the Report’s pet peeves, which have the weight of hearsay and anecdote, as well as its own investigations, behind them.
	A good example of this is the Report’s diagnosis of disengagement and declining turnout in general elections—one of its major preoccupations. The ‘reality’, it seems, is that ‘the process of formal democracy’ (a process which people feel ill-informed about) (a) offers people insufficient influence, (b) is run by parties they think are too similar and which require them ‘to commit to too broad a range of policies’, and (c) involves an electoral system whose procedures are ‘inconvenient’ and whose results are marred by ‘unequal and wasted votes’. Two of the biggest ‘red herrings’ in this case are, apparently, the suggestion that the public evince ‘a weak[ening] sense of public duty’ and ‘the lack of competitive elections’. Yet this seems to fly in the face of the latest research, much of which (as we note below) was available to, and in passing even acknowledged by, the Inquiry itself.
	There is, for example, clear research evidence that an election which looks like producing a foregone conclusion—a guess that is getting ever easier to make given the accuracy and ubiquity of public opinion polls—will significantly depress turnout, and probably more so than whether that election is held under a proportional or a plurality system. This is initially conceded by the Report—indeed, ‘the strong quantitative evidence’ in question is labelled (on p. 65) ‘enticingly logical’. But it is then summarily dismissed: the 2005 election, we are told, was ‘considerably closer’ than its predecessor, but ‘only’ resulted in a 2 percentage point rise in turnout; moreover, virtually no one the Report talked to had apparently mentioned the lack of competition as a reason for not bothering.
	Yet the first objection overstates the closeness of the election in question, while use of the word ‘only’ distracts from the fact that even a slight closing of the gap between the two main parties seems to have raised turnout. Meanwhile, the second objection cannot be used to simply write off the stand-out findings of painstaking cross-national work spanning decades, most obviously that of Mark Franklin, the dean of turnout studies who, for some reason, appears not have been consulted or cited by the Report. The only reason they are written off so easily must be that such findings don’t fit with the story the Report is so determined to tell and the solutions it wants to sell, namely that the main reason for low turnout is the perception that most votes are wasted votes—something that can supposedly be fixed by electoral reform. This, of course, ignores two very obvious objections: first, it is hard to blame a first-past-the-post system which has operated for many decades for the declining turnout and increasing disconnect of recent years; second, unless previous generations of voters really were more stupid than they are today (and we doubt that), it is unlikely that people have only just cottoned on to the fact that only marginal seats really count.
	Similarly, on ‘civic duty’, the Report notes the steep decline, particularly among younger people, in the number of people who feel duty-bound to vote. But this clearly crucial finding is promptly played down, if not dismissed, on the grounds (p. 58) that ‘it did not . . . sit easily with the evidence . . . which showed a vibrant and innovative realm of participation beyond formal democracy’. Now, even if we suspend our disbelief about this vibrant and innovative realm, it is still hard to see quite how it contradicts the importance of a decline in civic duty. The Report, however, has no such difficulties, opining that ‘it is quite possible that respondents to the above surveys were expressing not . . . a weak sense of civic duty but a broader lack of allegiance to formal democracy resulting from a strong sense that existing institutions and processes offer little meaning’. Its ability to read minds thus demonstrated, the Report then tries to buttress the case against declining civic duty by arguing that it is part of ‘a wider story’—one that sees people turning increasingly towards ‘pressure activity’. This is undoubtedly true—not least because there are more petitions, for instance, to sign nowadays as well as more of us prepared to sign them. But how and why this necessarily contradicts evidence of a decline in the feeling that it is one’s duty to vote is never explained, simply asserted.
	Finally, in its attempt to prove its own case on declining turnout, the Report turns to its own survey of just over one thousand non-voters, noting (on p. 60) that

Only 19 per cent cited apathy as a reason for not voting when asked the ‘open’ question: ‘what was the main reason for you not voting on 5th May’, [whereas] 36 per cent of non-voters cited political reasons such as lack of difference between the parties and claims that politicians ‘could not be trusted’.

	Yet, if one actually looks at the disaggregated responses things begin to look a little more complicated. First, ‘could not be bothered / didn’t care / didn’t get round to it’—the 19 per cent apathy the Report refers to—was the most common of the myriad responses offered. The next most common was ‘it was inconvenient’ (15 per cent). After that came ‘politicians are untrustworthy / promise things they can’t deliver’ (13 per cent), ‘personal reasons’ (ill health, death of relative, etc.) on 10 per cent, and ‘There was no choice on offer / no difference between the political parties’ (9 per cent). There then follows a host of other reasons, each cited by between 1 and 4 per cent of respondents.




The incipient populism of the Power Report is also revealed in its attitudes to academic expertise. The Inquiry held a number of witness sessions with political scientists, most notably perhaps Paul Whiteley of Essex University, Pippa Norris of Harvard, and Philippe Schmitter, late of the EUI in Florence, whose contributions were transcribed and are helpfully available on the Power Report’s website. A comparison between the transcripts and the Report, however, is illuminating.
	The academics stick to the evidence that they and others have accumulated from years of research. So, for example, Paul Whiteley stresses the following: an overall decline in participation in collective / contact forms (as opposed to individual / consumerist forms) of participation; that ‘pressure politics’ and voting is not a zero-sum game; that younger people today are less likely than their counterparts in previous generations to regard voting as a duty and that this constitutes one of the most important drivers of low turnout; that low turnout is also significantly related to elections that are done deals and fought in the ‘managerial’ centre ground, but that (ironically) the centre ground is where most people are and that delivery rather than ideology is what they want; and that strong parties are the only realistic alternative to interest group gridlock. Meanwhile, Pippa Norris stresses, too, that ‘formal’, ‘pressure’ and ‘consumer’ politics often involve the same people, as do civil society groups and more obviously political organisations like parties, which she likewise thinks need revitalising rather than weakening. And she, too, makes it clear that the UK’s relatively sharp drop in turnout is less explicable by long-term social trends than it is by short-term electoral competitiveness. For his part, Schmitter, as well as stressing forcefully the decline in civic duty (and what some would call ‘civic literacy’) among the young, but also pointing to how it has held up in Nordic countries,​[5]​ warns against too rosy a view of associational life outside formal politics: ‘There’s an extremely obvious reason why we don’t give more power to civil society; civil society is a very skewed group of people’—‘frankly a concentration of upper middle class [people] like ourselves and that’s it’.
	In other words, the academics—or at least those mentioned—reinforce the messages coming out of the published national and cross-national research, particularly as regards the contingent and cohort / civic duty explanations for turnout decline, the complementarity of ‘formal’ and ‘pressure’ or ‘consumer’ politics and group membership, and the continuing need for strong parties. But despite being thanked profusely for their contributions, they (or at least their expert judgement on the issues focused on here) clearly weighed less heavily with the Commission than the views of ‘the people’ as constituted by the surveyed non-voters, the focus-grouped community activists and the senders of submissions, ‘the very great majority [of which] had nothing positive to say about parties and elections’ (p. 50).
	This is not to say that the experts said nothing the Report could use. Quite reasonably, for instance, it refers to Norris’s findings that watching TV does not necessarily put people off politics to strike a sceptical note about the supposedly corrosive impact of a disdaining media, even if some (including Norris herself) would say that we need an awful lot more research in this area, particularly on, for example, the extent to which young people are affected by negative headlines that, in a media environment where they can tune out politics almost totally, will be all they ever see or hear on the subject.​[6]​ It is just that, in the Report, whenever the views of the experts conflict with those of ‘the people’, the former seem—in characteristically populist fashion—to lose out to the latter.

All or nothing—and don’t go abroad

Each of the Report’s recommendations (see pp. 20–5) apparently contributes to the ‘three fundamental shifts’ it wants to see, namely (1) ‘a shift of power away from the Executive . . . and from central to local’, (2) ‘the creation of an electoral and party system which is responsive enough to the changing values and demands of today’s population to allow the necessary and organic creation of new political alliances, value systems and organisations which better represent those values and demands’, and (3) ‘The creation of a culture of political engagement in which policy and decision-making employs direct input from citizens’. Moreover, ‘[t]hese three imperatives stand or fall alongside each other. The implementation of only one or two of the three’ will not be sufficient: they should not be ‘cherry picked’. So, ‘if the genuine aim is the creation of a newly vibrant democracy for Britain in the twenty-first century’ then apparently it’s all or nothing. Again, this is a characteristically populist demand: if the Augean stables need cleaning out, half measures—and the compromise, incrementalism, trade-offs and bargaining inherent in representative democracy—simply will not do.
	This all-or-nothing attitude might make sense if the Power Report’s suggested remedies were more impressive than its diagnoses. But they are not. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to see how some of the thirty solutions it suggests follow from the problems it identifies, to the extent that one could be forgiven for thinking that on occasions the solutions came first. Certainly, quite a few of the items on the menu have a decidedly retro (dare we say Charter 88?) feel to them, while others have been picked out of the long grass into which they were (quite rightly) kicked some time ago.​[7]​ It is also noticeable, and significant, that the only people the Report insists will have to accommodate and change are the politicians, never those they represent. Presumably, such change will come about indirectly. But to believe this is to fall into a kind of naive institutionalism—a belief that changing the rules will always, and even automatically, change those who play (or rather don’t play) the game.
	There also seems to have been very little attempt to look at what’s happened when some of the Report’s recommendations have been tried (or have long been in operation) elsewhere. For instance, the research papers produced by the Commission—though not, we note, the Report itself—observe that devolution in the UK does not thus far seem to have encouraged participation and engagement, citing the relatively low turnouts for elections to the Scottish and European Parliaments and the Welsh and London Assemblies. It raises the possibility, however, that this may be because the limited powers of such legislatures ‘might not make them attractive to voters’. The obvious thing to do, therefore, would have been to look further afield. One stand-out example could have been provided by New Zealand, which moved from FPTP to MMP from 1996 onwards. However, that would have presented the Inquiry with the inconvenient fact that the country’s long-term, slow decline in turnout does not appear to have been arrested: the turnout at the 2002 election, for instance, might have looked impressive from a British perspective, but it was the lowest on record. True, it did rise a little in 2005—but only because the result of that contest was so much less predictable than its predecessor. By the same token, a quick look across the Atlantic (and, indeed, the Alps) would suggest that a weak executive, strong ‘civil society’ and citizens’ initiatives do not necessarily deliver more participation or more positive attitudes, particularly when it comes to those already suffering socio-economic as well as political exclusion.​[8]​
	The latter group are also least likely to have the skills and resources to take advantage of the participatory-cum-deliberative techniques that the Power Report is also keen on. So keen, in fact, that it is quick to dismiss objections on the part of politicians to such exercises partly as ‘an unwillingness to share power with others’ (p. 236). But there are other serious problems. One is the cost. A cynic might highlight the fact that the apparent yearning for more participation and deliberation identified by the Power Report arises out of work conducted for it by representatives of a facilitation industry that would presumably do well for itself were such techniques to be widely and routinely used. We, however, confine ourselves to pointing out—knowing how focus groups can be easily swung one way or another depending on who conducts them—that such professionals would potentially wield enormous influence. There is also the more general problem that such exercises also run a much greater risk of ‘groupthink’ compared to elections involving not hundreds but thousands and even millions of independent souls, as anyone who has read James Surowiecki’s thought-provoking book The Wisdom of Crowds will appreciate. Finally, as the supposedly jealous local councillors pointed out to the Commission, if an exercise like the Harrow Open Budget were allowed to bind democratically elected representatives it would render their aggregative role (not to mention their accountability to their voters) problematic if not impossible.




We welcome the Report’s contribution and its attempt to stimulate a debate about power in the UK. Indeed, we agree with some of its analysis and with some of its criticisms. Its account of the development of partisan dealignment and the decline of party membership makes a great deal of sense, for example. So too does its concern about the prospect of a hermetically sealed world of professional politicians with little or no occupational experience outside politics. But we also recognise that any attempt by politicians themselves to argue against the Report will almost certainly be dismissed as predictable defensiveness. We, on the other hand, have no vested interest and so feel able to write more freely.
	We do not agree with the view of politics that the Power Report puts forward. It seems to us that its critique is based on a populist understanding of politics and that this is partial, misguided and, at times, at odds with the Report’s own prescriptions. True, there are major problems with representative politics in the UK—with Parliament, with the parties and with the electoral system. But the answer is not to undermine representative politics, but to understand it and make it work better. That means invigorating not constraining representative institutions such as political parties, and it might also mean that citizens need to alter the way they think and act towards politics and politicians.
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